Traditional computer systems suffer from a large trusted computing base (TCB), which exposes a large attack surface to various attackers. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) address the problem by vertically integrating hardware and software to provide an abstraction for stronger security guarantees while minimizing the size of the TCB. In this talk, I will give an overview of my Ph.D. research projects that try to address the real-world challenges of building and deploying TEEs. I will begin with a gentle introduction to TEE and then discuss why it is a promising way of securing data in use. Then, I will talk about challenges in exploring the design space of TEE. First, I will introduce a novel off-chip side-channel attack on TEEs to motivate why we shouldn't have a fixed threat model for all TEEs. Next, I will introduce Keystone, a software framework that enables building TEEs based on various needs such as different threat models and functionality requirements. Finally, I will discuss the challenges of extending TEE functionality without breaking security guarantees by introducing ongoing work on a formally verified interface for the cloning of TEEs. I will conclude the talk with future work.

온라인 줌 링크 : https://snu-ac-kr.zoom.us/j/81332973845?pwd=MnREYnl5Y0dPUE85ZmZqUlFJdTQ2Zz09 (암호: snuspl)

Dayeol Lee is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California, Berkeley. His research interests are system security, trusted execution environment, computer architecture, and formal verification. He has a BS and an MS in computer science and engineering from Pohang University of Science and Technology. Contact him at dayeol@berkeley.edu

문의: 소프트웨어플랫폼연구실(02-880-1611)